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The purpose of this note is to explore the effect that a per curiam
affirmance by a Florida District Court of Appeal might have on decisional
harmony in the State of Florida.
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The purpose of this note is to explore the effect that a per curiam
affirmance by a Florida District Court of Appeal might have on deci-
sional harmony in the State of Florida. This examination focuses on
concerns raised by the new constitutional jurisdiction' of the Supreme
Court of Florida. While each of the sections of the amendment presents
special problems, specific emphasis will be placed on that portion of
Article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution which allows dis-
cretionary review of district court decisions which are in conflict.2
Effective April 11, 1980, the Florida Supreme Court's jurisdiction
was restructured to drastically reduce the volume of cases requiring its
review.3 Now, the decisions of the various district courts of appeal are
final in all but a few well delineated situations. However, in at least one
specific area, the district courts have discretionary authority to deter-
mine whether their decisions will be truly final by precluding further
appellate review in Florida, or are capable of being heard in the Florida
Supreme Court. This specific area is commonly known as "conflict cer-
tiorari ' 4 and the discretion involved is whether to write an opinion.
If a litigant finds an adverse decision at the district court "ex-
pressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of
appeal, or of the supreme court on the same question of law," 5 further
1. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. (3)(b).
2. Art. V, sec. 3(b)(3) reads in part: "(3) May review any decision of a district
court of appeal that ...expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another
district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law."
3. "The impetus for these modifications was a burgeoning caseload and the
attendant need to make more efficient use of limited resources." FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030,
Committee Notes.
4. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3). While the amendment specifically deletes the
words "by certiorari," conflict certiorari merely refers to the Florida Supreme Court's
discretionary jurisdiction to review conflicts of decision. Id.
5. FLA. CONsT. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3).
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appellate review is available through the discretionary certiorari power
of the supreme court. However, when the district court of appeal deci-
sion is merely a per curiam affirmance without written opinion, the ap-
pellate process is halted." This occurs even if the reasoning behind that
particular decison would otherwise be in direct conflict with another
district court of appeal. Under the old jurisdictional standards, the case
must merely be "in direct conflict" with another case regardless of
whether the decision was rendered with a full written opinion. In at
least one instance," conflict was founded in a dissenting opinion to a per
curiam decision. However, since the new standard has been imposed
requiring an "express" conflict, review by the Florida Supreme Court
requires a written opinion.9
Granting certiorari in cases where particular points of law have
been decided differently in the various districts allows the Supreme
Court of Florida to prevent inconsistency in the lower courts.10 Thus,
"conflict certiorari" serves as an important tool in establishing uniform
justice. However, a decision without opinion hampers this ability to
provide a uniform application of the laws of Florida. The architect of
the new amendment, Justice Arthur England,"' has recognized the sig-
nificance per curiam affirmances have under the new rules of discre-
tionary conflict jurisdiction:
A decision not to write an opinion in any particular case may be
dispositive of the litigation. Therefore, district court judges will
play a significant role in the state's justice system by the exercise of
their judgment in this regard. No one questions the desirability of
some dispositions without opinion at the district court level, for ex-
ample, in cases which involve a straightforward application of ex-
6. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
7. FLA. CONST. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3).
8. Commerce Nat'l Bank in Lake Worth v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 284 So.
2d 205 (Fla. 1973); See also Huguley v. Hall, 157 So. 2d 417 (Fla. 1963) (using case
citations accompanying the "affirmed" decision along with an exhaustive dissenting
opinion).
9. See 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
10. Id.
11. For a complete discussion of the features of the amendment see England,
Hunter & Williams, Constitutional Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Florida:
1980 Reform, 32 U. FLA. L. REV. 147 (1980).
1 116 Nova Law Journal 6:19811
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isting law to individual and non-unique fact situations. On the
other hand, the responsibility for articulating decisions on questions
of law which might have statewide importance, or which might be
in conflict with other appellate decisions, now rests more heavily on
the district courts' judges. Perhaps greater precision will also be
required of counsel to isolate, identify, and discuss the issues of law
which they present to the district courts.21
Thus, the obligation toward the appellate decision-making process is
two-fold: the responsibility of district court judges to issue opinions
where conflict would otherwise exist, and the responsibility of counsel
to assist in delineating these conflicts.
Discussion
The basis for invoking conflict certiorari jurisdiction arises when
there is a "real and embarrassing" conflict between the decisions of the
appellate courts.13 However, the question has always been, to what ex-
tent can the Florida Supreme Court search for such a conflict? Soon
after the creation of the district courts, the court recognized that
[t]here may be exceptions to the rule that this court will not go
behind a judgment per curiam, consisting only of the word 'af-
firmed'. . . . Conceivably it could appear from the restricted ex-
amination required in proceedings in certiorari that a conflict had
arisen with resulting injustice to the immediate litigant.14
The general rule referred to was overruled in effect by the decision in
Foley v. Weaver Drugs,15 which allowed the Court to examine the "re-
cord proper" to ascertain if a conflict had arisen. Although the "record
proper" analysis was never defined,"8 Foley described it as "scrutiny on
12. Id. at 198.
13. See Ansin v. Thurston, 101 So. 2d 808, 811 (Fla. 1958).
14. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958).
15. 177 So. 2d 221 (Fla. 1965).
16. See Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823, 832 (Fla. 1970) (Thornal, J.,
dissenting):
The majority is out-Foleying Foley .... Just once, it would be helpful if
my colleagues who follow the Foley majority would actually define what is
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• ..the written record of the proceedings in the court under review
except the report of the testimony. . . . ",17 This type of analysis
merely allowed the Florida Supreme Court to inquire whether its own
decisions, or decisions of the various districts, would have decided the
case differently.18
The new jurisdictional amendment "abolishes the Foley doctrine
by requiring an 'express' as well as a 'direct' conflict of district court
decisions as a prerequisite to supreme court review."1" Consequently,
the Florida Supreme Court will no longer look behind decisions without
written opinions.
The majority opinion of Jenkins v. State,20 the major case after
the new amendment, squarely disposes of this issue:
Accordingly, we hold that from and after April 1, 1980, the Su-
preme Court of Florida lacks jurisdiction to review per curiam de-
cisions of the several district courts of appeal of this state rendered
without opinion, regardless of whether they are accompanied by a
dissenting or concurring opinion, when the basis for such review is
an alleged conflict of that decision with a decision of another dis-
trict court of appeal or of the Supreme Court of Florida."1
It leaves no doubt as to the posture of the Supreme Court in this issue.
Justice England's concurring opinion wholly supports and extends this
result, while providing a historical overview of the jurisdictional
amendment.22
The dissenting opinion,23 however, forewarns of the problems with
such a position:
We are embarking on a course which limits our jurisdiction to mat-
ters concerning deep questions of law, while the great bulk of liti-
cut definition in the books and I think our cases on the subject are ex-
tremely confusing.
17. 177 So. 2d at 223.
18. Id.
19. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030, Committee Notes.
20. 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla. 1980).
21. Id. at 1359.
22. Id. at 1360-63.
23. Id. at 1363-66 (Adkins, J., dissenting).
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gants are allowed to founder on rocks of uncertainty and trial
judges steer their course over a chaotic reef as they attempt to ap-
ply 'Per Curiam affirmed' decisions.24
Noting the potential chaos in a system in which the Florida Supreme
Court is precluded from harmonizing the district court decisions, Jus-
tice Adkins wrote that "[u]nder the construction proposed by the ma-
jority we will have well-written opinions, but the decisions of the five
district courts of appeal will be in hopeless conflict."25 In the interest of
reducing a "burgeoning caseload,"26 the amendment denies the su-
preme court any chance of reconciling this conflict. This was precisely
the thrust of the arguments against the amendment before its passage
into law. The burden of providing this opportunity for unformity now
rests with the district courts. Writing opinions in marginally conflicting
cases gives the Florida Supreme Court the choice of invoking their har-
monizing power.28
Obviously there is a place for decisions without opinion. However,
this method should be exercised only in circumstances when the case
below requires the "application of well settled rules of law,"' 29 and the
use of a written opinion would not add anything to the general body of
law in the particular area at issue. Cases which would otherwise con-
flict but for the per curiam affirmance, do not fall into this category. A
decision that might conflict with another appellate court would surely
add something to the law, albeit if only to allow the Florida Supreme
Court to harmonize the decisions. The large number of cases in which
certiorari was granted both pre and post Foley, illustrates this
proposition.3"
Moreover, in at least twenty cases, the Florida Supreme Court re-
24. Id. at 1363.
25. Id. at 1364.
26. FLA. R. App. P. 9.030, Committee Notes.
27. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 159.
28. Conflict jurisdiction lies within the discretionary portion of the supreme
court's jurisdiction. FLA. CONST. art. V. sec. 3(b)(3)-(9).
29. Newmons v. Lake Worth Drainage Dist., 87 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1956).
30. The Committee Notes to Fla. R. App. P. 9.030 characterized conflict peti-
tions as comprising "the overwhelming bulk of the Court's caseload and gave rise to an
intricate body of case law interpreting the requirements for discretionary conflict re-
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viewed the "record proper" after a per curiam decision and quashed or
reversed the decision of the district.31 Carmen Bank of Miami Beach v.
R.G. Wolff & Co.32 is an extreme example where after a per curiam
affirmance by the Third District, the court reviewed the "record
proper" and reversed per curiam.3 It is ironic that a case that once
would have been summarily reversed, would now be allowed to stand
without review. Recently, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed a
United States District Court grant of federal habeas corpus to a peti-
tioner whose conviction had been per ctiriam affirmed by the Second
District of Florida. 4 These problems of silent questionable decisions
can be avoided by the district courts choosing to write opinions, how-
ever terse, in even marginally conflicting cases. This approach does not
conflict with the supreme court's goal of reducing its caseload; petitions
of review from these cases would, nonetheless, remain within the
court's discretionary jurisdiction3 5 and could be rejected unless clear
conflict is shown. Little district court labor would be expended outlin-
ing the reasons for the decision in a short paragraph accompanying the
affirmance.
The underlying rationale in denying review to affirmances without
opinion is that the decision merely affects the individual litigants, hav-
ing little, if any, effect on the overall jurisprudence in the state, regard-
31. See City of Pompano Beach v. Big Daddy's, Inc., 375 So. 2d 281 (Fla.
1979); Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Carmen Bank of
Miami Beach v. R.G. Wolff & Co., 329 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1976); AB CTC v. Morejon,
324 So. 2d 625 (Fla. 1976); Baycol, Inc. v. Downtown Dev. Auth., 315 So. 2d 451
(Fla. 1975); D'Agostino v. State, 310 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1975); De La Portilla v. De La
Portilla, 304 So. 2d 116 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of McCartney, 299 So. 2d 5 (Fla.
1974); Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Cave, 295 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 1974); Adams v.
Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Lake Killarney Apts., Inc. v. Estate of Thomson,
283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973); Dyer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Co., 276 So. 2d 6 (Fla.
1973); Fountainbleau Hotel Corp. v. Walters, 246 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1971); Walden v.
Borden Co., 235 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1970); Gibson v. Maloney, 231 So. 2d 823 (Fla.
1970); Balbontin v. Pirias, 215 So. 2d 732 (Fla. 1968); SAF-T-CLEAN, Inc. v. Mar-
tin-Marietta Corp., 197 So. 2d 8 (Fla. 1967); Coleman v. Coleman, 190 So. 2d 332
(Fla. 1966); Kennedy v. Vandine, 185 So. 2d 693 (Fla. 1966); Young Spring & Wire
Corp. v. Smith, 176 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1965).
32. 329 So. 2d 298 (Fla. 1976).
33. Roberts, Acting C.J., Adkins, Boyd, England and Sundberg concurred.
34. Hicks v. Wainwright, 633 F.2d 1146 (5th Cir. 1981).
35. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3)-(9).
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less of the ratio decidendi. Unquestionably, this theory fails in two re-
spects. First, the affirmance settles the particular point of law for both
the district court and the trial courts below. Second, it was precisely
this perceived injustice to the individual litigant which paved the way
to the Foley38 era of "record proper" analysis.37
As to the first point, while an affirmance without opinion has no
precedential value in the sense that it will not be cited or used by fu-
ture courts, it does reflect the attitudes of the appellate court on those
specific points of law. Whether they are precedent, these decisions will
be the model for future appellate decisions. Concerning the trial courts,
a summary affirmance merely encourages a trial judge to believe his or
her application of the law was proper. Foley recognized this theme:
"Nor can we escape that in common parlance, an affirmance without
opinion of a trial court by a district is generally deemed to be an ap-
proval of the judgment of the trial court, and becomes a precedent,
certainly in the trial court rendering the judgment." 38 The law thus
settled becomes subject to straight-forward application resulting in fur-
ther per curiam affirmances. A particular type of case could become
subject to peculiar treatment in one district, while the other districts or
the Supreme Court of Florida could decide the same type of case in a
different fashion. Notwithstanding the Hoffman v. Jones"8 prohibition
against the districts rendering decisions which conflict with the settled
law of the Supreme Court of Florida, many cases have been granted
certiorari for just such a conflict.4 It is poor policy for the supreme
court to be precluded from protecting its own decisions.-
Secondly, even though a per curiam affirmance only directly af-
36. 177 So. 2d at 223.
37. See Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 641 (Fla. 1958).
38. 177 So. 2d at 225-26.
39. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
40. See Wills v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 351 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 1977); Courtelis v.
Lewis, 348 So. 2d 1147 (Fla. 1977); Williams v. State, 340 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1976); De
La Portilla v. De La Portilla, 304 So. 2d 113 (Fla. 1974); In re Estate of McCartney,
299 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 1974); Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Cave, 295 So. 2d 103 (Fla.
1974); Adams v. Whitfield, 290 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1974); Lake Killaney Apts., Inc. v.
Estate, 283 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 1973); Escobar v. Bill Currie Ford, Inc., 247 So. 2d 311
(Fla. 1971); Walden v. Borden, 235 So. 2d 300 (Fla. 1970); SAF-T-CLEAN, Inc. v.
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fects the individual litigant, it was this type of "resulting injustice to
the immediate litigant" that prompted the supreme court to begin "re-
cord proper" analysis. Originally it took nine years after the advent of
the district courts for the Foley type of exception to arise. A system
such as the present one may pave the way to its own exception to the
strict rule of no review without a written opinion.
In order to protect against loose use of per curiam decisionmaking,
briefing and argument by counsel at the district court level should not
only address the merits of their case, but also the possible conflicts that
may arise from a decision on these merits.4 1 This would help to pro-
mote "reckonability of result" 42 by alerting appellate judges to the pos-
sible conflicts which may arise, and ease the burden of fruitless appeals
from the trial courts. Moreover, it is generally recognized that petitions
for rehearing or clarification should now be more freely granted in the
district courts, thus providing another avenue for full written review.4 3
For example, if a case originally disposed of by per curiam affirmance
is granted either rehearing en banc44 of given clarification, 45 the written
opinion, if any, flowing from such a procedure might support conflict
jurisdiction. This, of course, would require the written opinion to be
"express" in its reasoning.48 It may also be argued that as an alterna-
tive to conflict certiorari jurisdiction, a litigant might seek to invoke the
extraordinary writ jurisdiction of the Florida Supreme Court.'
Conclusion
As a matter of policy, the courts of Florida should strive to obtain
decisional harmony at the district court level. Although the new juris-
dictional amendment was a hard fought battle, access to the Florida
41. Lake v. Lake, 103 So. 2d 639, 643 (Fla. 1958).
42. See LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION-DECIDING APPEALS 26
(1960).
43. See England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 198.
44. FLA. R. APP. P. 9.330.
45. Id.
46. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(3).
47. FLA. CONST. art. V, sec. 3(b)(7)-(9). But see St. Paul Title Ins. Corp. v.
Davis, 392 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1980) (holding that petitioner seeking review of per
curiam affirmance with our opinion, cannot invoke "all writs" provision of art. V, sec.
3(b)(7)).
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Supreme Court should still be available in all deserving cases. Justice
England rightly describes this aspect of the process as an obligation:
Section 3(b)(3) now places an increased obligation on district court
judges who again have some ability to control a party's right to
supreme court review. Now, as was originally intended, these
judges must keep a wary eye on the broad import of their decisions
before issuing an affirmance without opinion. It goes without saying
that the press and the public will keep a wary eye on them.48
Karl Llewellyn in The Common Law Tradition"9 saw "recognition
of doubt" 50 as an important aspect of an appellate judge's responsibility
in formulating opinions. Under the new Florida constitutional scheme,
district court judges should consider "recognition of doubt" in deter-
mining whether to use per curiam affirmances. If there is any doubt
regarding the potential for conflict, the courts should discard the option
of a per curiam decision without opinion, and write an opinion, no mat-
ter how brief, which permits Florida Supreme Court resolution of hon-
estly arguable conflicts.5
Victor Lance
48. England, Hunter & Williams, supra note 11, at 181.
49. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 42.
50. Id. at 12.
51. In a recent article, Justice England reviews the percentages of per curiam
affirmances without opinion following the adoption of the jurisdictional amendment.
Finding them substantially unchanged with respect to statistics of earlier years, he
makes this observation: "The district courts apparently did not seize upon the amend-
ment to expand the percentage of their dispositions without opinions during calendar
1980." England, A. & Williams, R., Florida Appellate Reform One Year Later, 9
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 223, 256 (1981). This seems to be an attempt at providing ad hoc
evidentiary support to an observation made in Florida Greyhound Owners & Breeders
Ass'n Inc. v. West Fowler Assoc., 347 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 1977): "The foul assumption
which underlies any review is that the district court perpetrated an injustice which it
could not explain away in an opinion. I refuse to indulge that assumption." Id. at 411
(concurring opinion). However, both observations miss the mark. It would be ludicrious
to assert that district court judges would ever attempt to "hide their mistakes". Yet,
because of the complexity of the issues in various cases, conflicts arise all too often.
This is aptly demonstrated by the unintentionally created conflicts reviewed during the
Foley era. See notes 31 & 40 supra.
Nonetheless, the thrust of this article is merely to point out the need for careful
123 116:1981
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consideration by the district courts of possible unstated conflicts. Inasmuch as Justice
England finds that the rate of per curiam affirmances has remained virtually un-
changed, it may be argued that the district courts have not recognized their "obliga-
tion" in this respect. It can be asserted that the percentage of per curiam affirmances
should decrease in proportion to the rate that review was formerly granted by the Su-
preme Court for review of per curiam affirmances during the Foley era.
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